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In his book Justice Accused,1 Robert Cover explores how and why ante-bellum Federal 
judges who were opposed to slavery consistently upheld the constitutionality of the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.2 These judges claimed that despite their strong personal 
convictions that slavery was immoral and wrong, they were constrained by the U.S. 
Constitution to declare the Act constitutional.3 As Cover convincingly demonstrates, 
however, the arguments for the constitutionality of the Act of 1850 were not widely 
perceived to be ironclad, even in 1850.4 Nevertheless, the judges, at least some of whom 
were sincere in their opposition to slavery, upheld the Act.  
In justifying their decision the judges relied on what Cover calls the ‘judicial can’t.’ 5 The 
judicial can’t is easily understood since it lies at the core of what most Americans 
understand judging to be: It invokes the duty of the judge to follow the law, not to make 
it. Confronted with claims by white lawyers on behalf of fugitive slaves that the Fugitive 
Slave Act was unconstitutional, the anti-slavery judges almost uniformly responded by 
invoking the formal limit of their powers. “As a citizen and as a man,” they said, “I may 
admit the injustice and immorality of slavery. ... But as a jurist, I must look at that 
standard of morality, which the law prescribes.”6 These judges felt themselves to be 
responding to a calling; their roles as judges required them courageously to suppress their 
personal morality in the service of higher principle which they understood as the 
impartial application of formal rules.7
1  Robert Cover, Justice Accused, (1975).
2  The Act dealt primarily with the jurisdiction and appointment of federal magistrates who would issue 
certificates for the return of escaped slaves. The magistrate was to oversee the proceedings and examine the 
affidavits of the slaveholder or his representative and then issue a certificate for the slave’s return. Slaves 
themselves were explicitly prevented from testifying and the Act also compensated the magistrates $10 when 
they returned slaves and only $5 when they denied the slaveholder’s petition. Id., pg. 175.
3  See Article 4, US. Constitution.
4  See Cover, supra note 1, at 119-97. 
5  Id . at 119.
6  Id . at 120 citing Jackson v. Bullock, 12 Conn. 39 (1837) (Judge Bissell dissenting). See also Justice McLean’s 
statement in Miller v. McQuerry that the question of the  natural right of slavery “is a field which judges can 
not explore” (cited in Id. at 120).  
7  For an interesting theory on why judges appear to welcome their subjection to law, see Slavoj Zizek, The 
Sublime Object of Ideology (1989). Zizek argues that the law of the law as it is expressed from Kant onwards, 
is that we must deny ourselves the free reign of our inclinations.  The moral law, therefore, is precisely the 
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I am interested in exploring why some judges, like those Cover discusses, rhetorically 
portray themselves as tragic heroes who are bound by the law when others, both 
dissenting judges and respected legal observers, argue that the law is unsettled.8 The 
questions of how judges judge, and why they judge as they do are important for two 
reasons. First, what judges say matters.  The words judges speak are transformed into the 
deeds of the executioner, the warden, and the immigration official.9 Further, as the 
centrality and importance of law in society expands, judges are now frequently 
responsible for deciding issues of primary importance to the way we, as a society, wish to 
live. From issues of abortion to those of environmental protection and even of free 
speech, moral and political debates have become increasingly legalized. Second, when 
judges claim they are bound by the laws, they are making an argument—an appeal to 
those of us upon whose consent their judicial authority rests—that being bound by laws is 
the appropriate way for a judge to approach his role.10 How judges defend their approach 
to judging, therefore, is likely to shed light on how as a society we believe that the major 
social and political decisions that judges make should be approached.  
Saying ‘I can’t’ rhetorically absolves the judge from having to make a choice or from 
assuming responsibility for the political or moral consequences of her decision. Of course 
the judge still makes a choice and assumes responsibility for her decision to act in 
accordance with the law; however, she is only deciding to act as she imagines herself to be 
instructed.11 To say ‘I won’t’, on the other hand, frames the decision as a choice, and thus 
requires judges to weigh competing moral imperatives and then privilege one over the 
other. 
The competing moral imperatives in the fugitive slave cases were clear to the judges 
Cover describes. On one side was their belief that slavery was evil, and that it contravened 
both natural law and common morality. On the other side was their argument that they 
were rule-bound actors who were obliged to enforce the democratically enacted Fugitive 
Slave Act. These positions appeal to two different understandings of the verb and the 
action, to judge. The first appeals to judgment, understood in the Kantian sense, as a free 
act of autonomous yet universal legislation. The second appeals to the judges’ 
understanding of themselves as role-players who are bonded to the application of 
particular cases to general legal rules.  
Yet these two positions on how a judge should approach his job of judging need not be 
contradictory. One may agree that a judge should understand his role as being bound by 
the law and not as that of a legislator. Nevertheless, contrary to the positivist assertions of 
the judges Cover discusses, agreement on how a judge is to approach his task is only the 
beginning and not the end of the judicial inquiry. Not for a lack of trying, legal positivists
renunciation of the desire to transgress the limits of the law—i.e. to subject oneself to the law. According to 
Zizek, what we in fact desire is the law itself.  
8  The tragic flaw that compels the ante-bellum judges to uphold laws they consider inherently unjust is the 
supposed virtue of fidelity to the law.  Like Captain Vere in Melville’s novel Billy Budd and Creon in Sophocles 
Antigone, the ante-bellum judges appeal to their role as agents of the legal order to justify actions which are, 
in the objective nomos in which the judges exist, considered unjust.  
9  See Robert Cover, “Violence and the Word” 95 Yale Law Review 1601 (1986).
10  See Jerry Frug, “Argument As Character,” 40 Stanford Law Review 869 (1988).
11  The judges’ rhetorical move of presenting her role as that of merely interpreting the will of the people 
serves as a legitimizing discourse. Id., at 869. 
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—those who believe judges should judge according to either a close textual exegesis or an 
accessible standard such as efficiency—have yet to identify a master rule on which legal 
interpretation can be grounded. The law does not remain static; it grows and adapts while 
continually incorporating new understandings and re-interpretations. Even judges who 
proclaim absolute fidelity to the same rules, precedents, and institutional obligations, can 
and often do disagree as to the outcome of a case. Despite their protestations, therefore, 
the ante-bellum judges who upheld the fugitive slave laws did have a choice of whether to 
find the Fugitive Slave Act unconstitutional.12 Judges, Cover reminds us, are never as 
constrained in their legal interpretations as they claim to be.13
As does Cover, Hannah Arendt remains committed to the belief that people have more 
freedom to resist the rationalized injustices of bureaucratic institutions than they usually 
believe.14 Arendt attempted to balance her acknowledgment of the need for the stability 
guaranteed by a legal-political order with a demand that we as humans can and must 
assume responsibility over our collective fate. In this paper I explore Arendt’s attempt to 
negotiate, without resolving, what I call the paradox of autonomy and limitation. We, as 
individuals, as citizens, and as members of various political organizations, possess some 
level of freedom and autonomy to create and to change who and what we are; yet we must 
limit that autonomy in order to live peaceably together. While Arendt addresses this 
paradox as part of her philosophical investigation of politics, autonomy and limitation 
correspond to the two understandings of judging mentioned above. Autonomy requires 
that a judge consider himself capable of creating new laws, while limitation demands that 
a judge remain bound by his duty to interpret the law. Arendt’s unwillingness to resolve 
these paradoxes—e.g. by declaring the substantive norms and limits governing the terms 
of political or judicial autonomy—is ultimately, I argue, an ethical attempt to preserve a 
space of human freedom, autonomy, and self-creation as a dynamic force within a stable 
and successful legal order.15 
12  Cover advances a number of legal and constitutional theories available to the judges and advanced by the 
lawyers representing the slaves which could have been adopted by the judges.  See Cover, supra note 1, at 62-
119 and 131-197. 
13  Id . 
14  See e.g. Hannah Arendt, “‘Eichmann in Jerusalem:’ An Exchange of Letters between Gershom Scholem and 
Hannah Arendt,” in Jew as Pariah, ed. by Ron H. Feldman (1978) pg. 248-9.
15  In reading Arendt as ethically clearing a space in which politics and judgment is held to be both necessary 
and impossible, I am suggesting a connection between Arendt and  what certain contemporary philosophers 
have called ethical deconstruction.  See e.g.  Drucilla Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit, (1992) pgs. 81-90 
and Jacques Derrida, “The Force of Law,” 11 Cardozo Law Review 919 (1990). Ethical deconstruction, as 
developed by Jacques Derrida and Drucilla Cornell relies on what they call a double move in reading through 
which the reader must both be responsive to what is being read, and also take responsibility for what the 
reader makes the text become as a result of his reading. Translated into the sphere of ethics, the subject must 
recognize that the Other she confronts exists as other and can never be known. No matter how one tries to 
bring the Other into oneself, the Other as Other always resists such a sublimation and maintains itself as 
Other through its excess—its joussiance— which cannot be unmediately represented. The Other therefore 
imposes certain limitations on an ethical subject’s attempt to know, to understand, or to read the Other. An 
ethical reading is one in which the reader is understood to exercise responsibility to the otherness of the text, 
a self-imposed limit to the reader’s claim of autonomy which respects the integrity of the other. Likewise, 
ethical judgment requires that the judge take seriously the particularity of the person be judged and refrain 
from unproblematically subsuming particular persons and events under general rules. For a more detailed 
analysis of ethical deconstruction in Cornell’s philosophy, see my review of Cornell’s work, “Risk of the Self: 
Drucilla Cornell’s Transformative Philosophy,” 9 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 175 (1994).
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In exploring Arendt’s unwillingness to resolve the paradox of autonomy and limitation, I 
read Arendt’s own act of judging in the epilogue of her book Eichmann in Jerusalem as an 
ethical critique of the Israeli judges who, in sentencing Eichmann to death, justified their 
decision by appealing to their role as interpreters of general laws. In appealing to laws 
and legal precedents, the positive legal system, which, Arendt argues, was completely 
inadequate to justify the court’s decision, the Israeli court, like the ante-bellum judges in 
Cover’s study, sought to deny their autonomy in a case in which ethical acceptance of 
their at least partial autonomy was called for. Rather than meet the unique and 
exceptional case presented by Eichmann in its terrifying particularity, the Israeli judges 
subsumed Eichmann’s compliance with a genocidal regime under the existing criminal 
laws of Israel. By opposing her confident and definitive judgment as an appeal to the 
normative community to the judges’ rule-bound approach, Arendt suggests that judges, at 
least in certain extraordinary circumstances, should recognize their freedom to judge 
freed from the constraints of general guidelines and autonomously will themselves to act.  
Arendt appeals to all of us, judges as well as those of us who may seek to maintain our 
innocence by faithfully obeying the law, to assume our obligation to think, to judge, and to 
act in response to particular events without the illusory assurance of the judicial ‘can’t.’    
Such an attitude toward the law need not deny the importance of law as a stabilizing and 
moral force in society; it does, however, suggest that obedience to law should proceed 
under the aegis of a law that acknowledges transformative potentialities, rather than 
operate under the fiction of legal certainty. 
II. Thoughtlessness
In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt argues that Eichmann’s complicity with the Nazi 
regime and participation in carrying out the Final Solution illustrates what she terms the 
banality of evil;16 the fact that evil can be and is sometimes perpetrated by individuals 
whose only fault is the bureaucratic virtue of blindly obeying the law. While the Israeli 
court perceived that Eichmann’s crimes were unprecedented, it was unable or unwilling 
to understand that Eichmann was not an evil monster, a devil, or even a virulent anti-
Semite,17 but rather that he was “terribly and terrifyingly normal.”18 Eichmann’s 
complicity in genocide was not the result of his being a fanatic or an ideologue, Arendt 
argues, but rather of his being shallow and thoughtless. Eichmann did not think about 
what he was doing. Inured by his thoughtlessness against intermittent flashes of reality—
his recognition that the Jews were as human as himself—Eichmann saw himself as a 
victim, a cog in a machine, who was simply doing his duty by following orders. 19  
The banality of evil accompanies what Arendt decries as the rise of thoughtlessness. 
Thoughtlessness, “the heedless recklessness or hopeless confusion of our time,”20 presents 
16  Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963) at 252 [hereafter Eichmann].
17  Arendt notes that Eichmann had never read Mein Kampf (Id. at 33) and professed to have Jewish friends and 
family which he presents as proof that he had no ill will toward Jews (Id. at 29-30).
18  Id. 276
19  Arendt argues that Eichmann understood himself and reality only through ‘officialese,’ what he called his 
only language. Officialese, the language of clichés and empty talk proved to be “the most reliable of all 
safeguards against the words and the presence of others, and hence against reality as such.” Id. at 49.
20 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, (1958) pg. 5 [hereafter HC].
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the modern world with the danger not of disruptive transgression, but of unthinking 
obedience to an unjust authority. Eichmann’s thoughtlessness represents only one 
frightening example of what Arendt fears that the people of the world are becoming.  
When Arendt describes Eichmann as ‘normal,’ she means that he, at least as he perceived 
himself, was simply trying to secure for himself and his family the modern bourgeoisie 
lifestyle he, like most of us in the Western industrialized world, had been taught to 
respect.  It was ambition rather than hatred, Arendt argues, that motivated Eichmann to 
join the SS.21  
In addition to economic security, however, Arendt argues that Eichmann justified 
complicity in the Final Solution by denying personal responsibility. Bureaucratic 
authority serves as an essential condition for denying responsibility, Arendt argues, 
because it allows people to refuse to think about what they do. State and private 
bureaucracies require a rationalized division of labor and emphasize hierarchy and 
efficiency, to provide ready rationalizations for ‘normal jobholders and family men’ to 
justify their otherwise unjustifiable actions.22 Their “conscience cleared through the 
bureaucratic organization of their acts,” these shallow men, who “out of sheer passion ... 
would never do harm to a fly,” were able systematically to murder millions of Jews and 
Gypsies, and still not to think about what they were doing long enough to recognize 
themselves as murderers.23   
Arendt defines totalitarianism as a “methodical genocide ‘within the frame of a legal 
order.’”24 Her insight is that there is no bureaucracy yet invented that is better geared to 
absolving its actors from personal responsibility for their acts and thus encouraging the 
rise of thoughtlessness than the modern legal system. Because the efficacy of law depends 
so heavily on its ability to do violence, it must develop and employ “cues that operate to 
bypass or suppress the psycho-social mechanisms that usually inhibit people’s actions 
causing pain and death.”25 In other words, the wardens and executioners who voluntarily 
exercise the acts of violence and domination required by the law, need to overcome the 
21  Eichmann, supra note 16, at 33. In his search for security and prestige, Eichmann is similar to what 
Arendt terms the pater familias, the family man.  [Hannah Arendt, “Organized Guilt and Universal 
Responsibility,” in Arendt, The Jew as Pariah, supra note 14, at 232.]  In her early attempts to understand 
why so many ‘normal’ Germans participated in the Nazi genocide machine, Arendt suggests that the 
‘chaotic economic conditions of our time’ have uprooted families and elevated a concern for security to 
the forefront of the bourgeoisie mind. For the sake of his economic security and his family, the 
bourgeoisie family man, Arendt argues, “was ready to sacrifice his beliefs, his honor, and his human 
dignity ... The only condition he put was that he should be fully exempted from responsibility for his 
acts.” I  d. 
22 Id .
23  Id . at 234. Arendt quotes a dialogue between an American correspondent and a German soldier: 
Q: Did you kill people in the Camp? A: Yes.
Q: Did you poison them with gas? A: Yes.
...
Q: What did you think of what was going on? A: It was bad at first but we got used to it.
Q: Do you know the Russians will hang you? A: (Bursting into tears) Why should they? What have I done? [Id. 
pg. 231, (quoting PM, Sunday, Nov. 12, 1944)].  
As Arendt remarks, “Really he had done nothing.  He had only carried out orders and since when has it been a 
crime to carry out orders?” at 231.
24 George Kateb, Hannah Arendt, (1984) pg. 76 citing Hannah Arendt, “Personal Responsibility Under 
Dictatorship.”
25  Cover, “Violence and the Word,” supra note 9, at 1613.
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normal inhibitions which restrain their autonomous behavior. One of the most effective 
ways in which the law does this is through its division of labor between judges who are 
responsible for interpreting the law’s words, and prison and court officers who are 
responsible for administering the law’s deeds. As Robert Cover argues in his essay 
“Violence and the Word,” the legal bureaucracy facilitates the job of those charged with 
doing its violence by separating them from the responsibility for thinking about the 
justice of their acts. “No wardens, guards or executioners,” Cover writes, “wait for a 
telephone call from the latest constitutional law scholar, jurisprude or critic before 
executing prisoners, no matter how compelling the interpretations of these others may 
be.”26 The bureaucratic division of labor makes it easier, therefore, for
”[p]ersons who act within social organizations that exercise authority [to] act 
violently without experiencing the normal inhibitions or the normal degree of 
inhibition which regulates the behavior of those who act autonomously. When judges 
interpret, they trigger agentic behavior within just such an institution or social 
organization“27.
In justifying his actions, Eichmann did not claim, as did the German generals at 
Nuremberg, the defense of obeying orders. It was not simply orders which Eichmann 
obeyed; Arendt argues that to understand Eichmann’s compliance—his agentic behavior 
—it is necessary to understand that Eichmann saw himself as duty-bound to obey the 
laws. In the Nazi regime, where the will of the Fuhrer was the law, Eichmann was a law-
abiding citizen.28 As Arendt shows, there were times when Eichmann explicitly disobeyed 
Himmler’s bureaucratic directives seeking to moderate the Final Solution because 
“Eichmann knew that Himmler’s orders ran directly counter to the Fuhrer’s order.”29 
Eichmann saw Himmler as corrupt, someone who thought himself above the law, and 
thus Eichmann justified his disobedience by appealing to the law. Eichmann did not 
oppose Himmler’s moderation at the end of the war out of a “boundless hatred of Jews,” 
as the prosecution in the Israeli trial argued; he did so because his conscience prohibited 
him from disobeying the law as he knew it. In the Nazi regime, conscience becomes an 
unreliable guide which is demonstrated by the fact that Eichmann felt bound by his 
conscience to obey the law.30 
It is just such a situation that the Eichmann trial presented to the Israeli court and to 
Arendt. Eichmann invoked his own version of the Kantian formula of duty: To be a law-
abiding citizen meant not merely to obey the laws, but to act as if one were the legislator 
of the laws that one obeys.31 As Arendt argues, this interpretation of Kant’s categorical 
26 Id . 1625.
27  Id ., at 1613-1615.
28 Arendt, Eichmann, supra note 16, at 24. This of course is a controversial claim in legal theory debates. See 
H.L.A. Hart, “Legal Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” 71 Harvard Law Review, 598 (1958).
29 Arendt, Eichmann, supra note 16, at 147.
30 “For the sad and very uncomfortable truth of the matter probably was that it was not his fanaticism but his 
very conscience that prompted Eichmann to adopt his uncompromising attitude during the last year of the 
war, as it had prompted him to move in the opposite direction for a short time three years before.” Id., at 146.
31  Id . at 135-36. It is interesting to note that Hegel warned of the danger of Kant’s being read in this subjectivist 
way in the Preface to the Philosophy of Right. See Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, trans. by T.M. Knox (1952) 
pgs. 5-6. For an argument that Hegel’s attack on J.F. Fries and the nationalistic, ant-Semitic, and terrorist 
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imperative missed what she believes to be the essential element of Kant’s formulation:  
That by thinking and the use of ‘practical reason,’ one must act according to the principles 
that could and should be the principle of universal laws. What Eichmann drops out of 
Kant’s imperative is universality.   
The problem of the banality of evil reaches its height when the duty to obey the laws can 
be invoked in the name of evil. Because obedience to the law remains for many a cardinal 
virtue—even greater than the simple virtue of obedience to orders,—we need not think 
about what we are doing when we obey laws. Like wardens and executioners, 
businessmen whose lawyers tell them that it is not illegal to build dangerously defective 
cars or to pollute the world’s environment, do not usually call up their local constitutional 
scholars or moral philosophers to discuss the implications of their acts. While reflection 
and argumentation may (or may not) suggest that executing a murderer is different from 
exterminating entire races of people, the agents of the legal system, like Eichmann , rely 
on legal authorization of their actions to justify their violence. It is easier for an 
executioner, instead of thinking about the death penalty in general or its specific 
application to the prisoner before him, simply to throw the switch and consider himself as 
a law abiding citizen. Indeed such rationalizations are necessary for the efficient workings 
of our modern society.
Arendt’s awareness and fear of thoughtlessness is linked to her enduring commitment 
to and engagement with the relation between thought and political freedom. The greatest 
threat to that freedom today, Arendt argues, is the thoughtless acceptance of our 
individual and collective powerlessness.32 When people act as if they are constituted by 
their society—i.e. if they understand their condition to be one of heteronomy—then 
politics, the process of choosing how to live, becomes secondary if not meaningless. It is 
when we as citizens internalize Eichmann’s conclusion that he “no longer ‘was master of 
his own deeds,’ [and] that he was unable ‘to change anything,’”33 that we, as he did, cease 
to think about who we are and where we are going. It is precisely when the members of a 
society cease to think and thus abdicate their responsibility for self-creation, Arendt 
argues, that the potential of evil in modern society arises.  
In spite of over two centuries of social science research that has sought to prove that 
individuals are constituted and determined by their environment, Arendt strives to 
remind us that we retain some measure of autonomy. To assert autonomy is neither 
vainly to assert our absolute freedom from the past nor to claim our sovereignty and 
mastery over the world. Arendt recognizes that we are, as Heidegger argues, always 
already ‘thrown’ into this world, and that who we are is in a significant way ‘rooted’ in the 
student movement which Fries supported is presented as a warning against the degeneration of Kantian 
philosophy into an “ethic of mere subjective intentions,” see “The Owl of Minerva and the Critical Mind,” by 
Shlomo Avineri, in Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, ed. by Avineri (1972), pg. 120.
32  While Arendt recognized that outright resistance to totalitarian regimes is sometimes impossible, she does 
argue that even if one does not resist, he has the power to ‘do nothing’  (Arendt, Jew as Pariah, supra note 14, 
at 248). Even members of the SS, Arendt notes, could ask to be relieved of their duties without any penalties. 
(249) For another account of how individual people within post-totalitarian or bureaucratic regimes can 
exercise power simply by asserting their right to not participate in the regime’s programs, see Vaclav Havel, 
“The Power of the Powerless,” trans. by P. Wilson, in Vaclav Havel, Living in Truth, ed. by Jan Vladislav, 
1986.
33  Arendt, Eichmann, supra note 16, at 136.
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history into which we are born.34 Autonomy does assert, however, that people are the 
source of their laws—i.e. they have at least some capacity for self-creation—and that they 
are at least partially free to choose or judge who and what they will be.  
For people who claim autonomy and with it the freedom to judge particular events 
according to their wills, there are two related dilemmas.35 The first is the dilemma of 
autonomy itself:  how do we who are free and thus without ultimate grounds, make 
choices or judgments about how to organize our lives? The second is the dilemma of 
limitation:  once we have chosen how to live our lives, how can we ensure that we (and 
our posterity) will choose to abide by our choices and live according to the institutions we 
have created? Together, the dilemmas of autonomy and limitation comprise one of the 
central paradoxes of politics as it is understood in the Greek and Western tradition. Much 
of Western political theory has been obsessed with resolving or, at the least, taming this 
paradox; against this trend, I argue in the next two sections that Arendt sought instead to 
articulate and affirm this paradoxical need for both autonomy and limitation. To accept 
limits of the way the world is is to foreclose the possibility and the need to aspire to a 
better world; it is to imprison oneself in positivism and thus to eclipse the transformative 
possibilities and potentialities of imagining a new future. Throwing away the limits of the 
present, however, even in the name of a more just future order, ignores the basic 
rootedness within which we live. For Arendt, there is no ethical or productive way to 
reconcile the needs of freedom and order except by courageously and simultaneously 
embracing both.
III. Autonomy and Limitation
Man is a political animal, Arendt argues, not only because he has the faculties of speech 
and action, but also because he is to an important degree fated to try and found stable and 
lasting institutions and conventions in which he can live together with others. Politics is 
about the founding and maintenance of collective social structures within which man 
must live. Citizens can, through politics, partially escape the constraints of the social and 
historical processes which otherwise govern their lives, and come to understand the true 
meaning of autonomy: that people are the makers of their norms and the partial masters 
of their fate.36   
34  See Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, (1984) pg. 138. The characteristic of 
thrownness (Geworfenheit) is a metaphysical presupposition of our being in, and therefore, to a certain 
degree, overwhelmed by and governed by, our world.   
35  For a more involved account of these dilemmas see Cornelius Castoriadis, “The Greek Polis and the Creation 
of Democracy,” in Cornelius Castoriadis, Philosophy, Politics, and Autonomy (1991), pg. 81 [hereafter 
Castoriadis]. 
36  Arendt usually speaks of freedom and not autonomy and she has significant reasons for doing so. Because 
action is always narrative, and thus indeterminate, man can, as she says, never master his world.  [Arendt, 
HC, supra note 20, at 234] Autonomy, understood as self-rule, is in many ways closer to sovereignty which 
Arendt recognizes as an impossible but necessary aspiration. Yet Arendt’s use of freedom is often very similar 
to what I mean by autonomy. Freedom, she says, “is the freedom to call something into being which did not 
exist before, which was not given, not even as an object of cognition or imagination, and which therefore, 
strictly speaking, could not be known.” [Hannah Arendt, “What is Freedom?,” in Between Past and Future, 
ed. by Hannah Arendt (1977) pg. 151 {hereafter Freedom}] Thus freedom includes the ability to create, even if 
such creation is ultimately indeterminate and contingent. Understood in this way, freedom and autonomy are 
synonymous. I favor autonomy because I think it better represents the thrust of Arendt’s meaning, even 
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Politics, Arendt argues, requires both autonomous action and the limitation of that action. 
Action, she argues, has three basic features: plurality, natality, and narrativity.37 Plurality 
signifies that all people are both alike and unique and is, Arendt argues, “the basic 
condition of both action and speech.”38 Plurality is both what defines all people as 
members of the same species and what recognizes their unique individuality and capacity 
for individual thought. Natality refers to the capacity of equal and yet distinct subjects to 
speak and to act publicly and thus through “word and deed” to insert themselves “into the 
human world.”39 Natality is like a ‘second birth’ and the capacity for creation. To act, 
Arendt writes, is to take an initiative, to begin, and to create something new, something 
which may be extraordinary and unexpected. “The fact that man is capable of action 
means that the unexpected can be expected from him, that he can perform what is 
infinitely improbable.”40 Natality is necessary for politics—especially for a politics that is 
to recognize man’s autonomy.  It is only if man retains the possibility of action that he can 
truly call himself free and that he is capable of participating in politics. While plurality 
and natality define the conditions of the possibility of man’s autonomy, narrativity 
reconnects man’s actions to the human world. Action and speech are always immersed in 
and revealed through a web of human relationships.41 Thus, while natal actions are 
marked by their assertion of autonomy, the narrativity of action ensures that human 
action will be subject to an unending series of interpretations and re-interpretations that 
prevents man from ever attaining complete freedom, sovereignty, or autonomy.42 The 
narrativity of action prevents natal actions from establishing themselves as certain and 
ensures the unending need for politics operating in the insurmountable yet fertile space of 
autonomy and limitation.
While action understood as plurality, natality, and narrativity is necessary for politics, it 
is not by itself sufficient. Politics also requires a stable space, a space of appearances, 
which provides the institutional framework within which action and politics occur. The 
space of appearance serves as a place where citizens can speak and act among others.  It 
is, as Arendt says, “a kind of organized remembrance,” both for the heroic acts of 
individuals and for the polis “as it arises out of  acting and speaking together.”43 The space 
of appearance exists when people gather to act together and is the precursor of the 
“formal constitution of the public realm and the various forms of government, that is, the 
various forms in which the public realm can be organized.”44 The space of appearances is 
the pre-political constitution—i.e. the way of being—of the citizens of the polis and 
therefore includes certain presuppositions about the way that decisions and politics will 
be organized.
though I recognize that in doing so I risk the implication of sovereignty which is unintended.    
37  See Seyla Benhabib, “Judgment and the Moral Foundations of Politics in Arendt’s Thought,” Political Theory 
(Feb. 1988) pg. 32 [hereafter Judgment].
38 Arendt, HC, supra note 20, at 175.
39  Id ., at 176.
40 Id ., at 178.
41 Id  ., at 181, 183. 
42  See Id., at 230-36. 
43  Id ., at 198.
44 Id., at 199.
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Against this pre-political realm of presuppositions, however, the possibility of natality 
suggests that actors in the public space could challenge the structure of, or even the very 
presence of, the public space.45 The structural paradox running through much of Arendt’s 
work is that pre-political institutions that make politics and stability possible must be 
maintained, and yet must be constantly open to challenge and redirection by autonomous 
citizens. Arendt writes, “No civilization—the man-made artifact to house successive 
generations—would ever have been possible without a framework of stability, to provide 
the wherein for the flux of change.”46 As Arendt describes the paradox in The Human 
Condition:
”The frailty of human institutions and laws and, generally, of all matters pertaining to 
men’s living together, arises from the human condition of natality and is quite 
independent of the frailty of human nature … The limitations of the law are never 
entirely reliable safeguards against action from within the body politic, just as the 
boundaries of territory are never entirely reliable safeguards against action from 
without. The boundlessness of action is only the other side of its tremendous capacity 
for establishing relationships, that is, its specific productivity; this is why the old 
virtue of moderation, of keeping within bounds, is indeed one of the political virtues 
par excellence, just as the political temptation par excellence is indeed hubris (as the 
Greeks, fully experienced in the potentialities of action, knew so well) and not the will 
to power, as we are inclined to believe.“47
The paradox of Arendtian politics is that the boundlessness of action does not recognize 
limitation and yet civilization itself requires limitation of action and maintenance of 
stability. To negotiate this paradox, institutions must be created that institutionalize 
practices and establish rights or habits on which people can rely.48 Some standards on the 
limits of political action, on the limits of autonomy, must be established. But to resolve 
the paradox by institutionalizing standards and practices as the basis of politics is to 
remove those institutions from the political realm—to make them into the pre-political 
givens of a society—and thus to deny the citizens their autonomy. To follow the opposite 
approach and embrace the boundlessness of action, however, disregards the necessity of 
certain basic limitations. To resolve the paradox in either direction, therefore, leads either 
to a tyranny of the present or an anarchy of the future.  
45  Feminist critics of Arendt have argued that Arendt’s positioning of the pre-political realm as prior to politics 
is tied to her privileging of praxis over poesis and thus the male public realm over the female private realm. 
While I agree that Arendt’s schematic distinction between the public and the private realms in The Human 
Condition is susceptible to such a critique, I believe that Arendt’s refusal to ever freeze the political and her 
embrace of a temporal politics of both limitation and autonomy disrupts any interpretations of her work that 
too heavily emphasize her schematic division of the world.
46 Hannah Arendt, “Civil Disobedience,” in Hannah Arendt, The Crises of the Republic (1972) pg. 79 .
47  Arendt, HC, supra, note 20, at 191.
48 But Arendt’s public space cannot simply be the formal legal guarantees of free speech and the right of 
assembly. Rather, it is the place of critical reflection, courage, responsibility, and the creation of new norms 
and orders. Lacking these substantive elements, Arendt’s public space becomes “just an open space for 
advertising, mystification, and pornography—as is increasingly the case today.” Castoriadis, supra note 35, at 
113. For a fascinating conception of what public space requires (access to a symbolic universe), see Drucilla 
Cornell, Transformations (1993) pgs. 57-111.
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One danger in the Arendtian conception of politics is that the paradox itself becomes 
abstracted into the non-negotiable and reified object of political debate. Arendt’s 
unwillingness to give content to the paradox and to define which substantive institutions 
and standards should comprise the “normative presuppositions of the political” has 
disturbed some of her critics.49 These critics argue that while Arendt sometimes speaks as 
if there is a substantive goal of politics, namely agon, there is a tendency in her work to 
reify politics and to argue that it is politics itself that must be preserved. It is true that 
Arendt’s tendency to mystify politics treats politics as the answer instead of as the 
question. Democratic politics becomes, for Arendt, “a politics of self-limitation, where the 
urge to win, to impose one’s will on the rest of the community is limited by a recognition 
of the contingent and relative nature of any claim to speak for the general interest or the 
community as a whole, including one’s own claims.”50 Arendtian politics becomes, say her 
critics, a reified end in itself that ignores the substantive interests and concerns of the 
people.
It is true that Arendt does not attempt to resolve the paradox of autonomy and 
limitation by recourse to any substantive standards that would determine when limitation 
should give way to autonomy and vice versa. Arendt recognized the impossibility of 
definitively defining any normative or moral standards which would give substance to this 
paradox when she wrote that, “action can be judged only by the criterion of greatness, 
because it is in its nature to break through the commonly accepted and reach into the 
extraordinary, where whatever is true in common and everyday life no longer applies 
because everything that exists is unique and sui generis.”51 But refusing to give moral 
content to the negotiation of the paradox need not be, as her critics suggest, unethical.  
For Arendt, the refusal to determine substantive standards according to which one 
might resolve the paradox between autonomy and limitation may be an ethical attempt to 
preserve the political realm as the space of human freedom and natality. In Arendt’s work, 
freedom and politics are inseparable. Freedom is not the liberal or stoic freedom from 
politics, but the freedom of “men to live together in a political organization.”52 To have the 
freedom to act and to create a new world or self is, at the least, to have the freedom to risk 
the old one. Thus, while Arendt clearly recognized that ‘greatness’ was inadequate as a 
moral standard to evaluate action, as well as the necessity of having moral standards, she 
was unwilling to propose her own substantive moral standards as the pre-political 
foundation.53  
Those who fault Arendt for not specifying the normative presuppositions of politics 
may miss the democratic spirit in which Arendt’s paradoxical presentation of politics is 
rooted. Politics seeks to erect boundaries that limit freedom in order of protecting a legal 
order; yet, in a democracy, there cannot be any extra-societal limits on the boundless 
capacity of action to be self-creating and thus simultaneously world-destroying. That is, in 
a democratic society, the only limits that can be relied on to restrain the boundlessness of 
49 See Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self (1992) pg. 103 , and Judgment, supra note 37.  Benhabib argues, 
through Habermas, that Arendt neglects the need for a moral foundation of judgment.  
50 Alan Keenan, “Arendtian Themes in the Work of Ernesto Laclau,” paper on file with author.
51  Arendt, Human Condition, supra note 20, at 205.
52  Arendt, Freedom, supra note 36, at 146. 
53  See Arendt’s discussion of Jefferson’s and Paine’s conclusion that it was “‘vanity and presumption [to 
govern] beyond the grave’” in Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (1963) pg. 233.
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action are self-imposed limits, which are often no limits at all. That is why Arendt rightly 
saw that in a democracy hubris  and moderation are respectively the most subversive and 
most virtuous of political temptations. Hubris is what destroys democratic polities 
because it extends the truth of democratic autonomy to unsustainable limits. As Cornelius 
Castoriadis argues:
”Hubris does not simply presuppose freedom, it presupposes the absence of fixed 
norms, the essential vagueness of the ultimate bearings of our actions. ... 
Transgressing the law is not hubris, it is a definite and limited misdemeanor.  Hubris 
exists where self-limitation is the only ‘norm,’ where ‘limits’ are transgressed which 
were nowhere defined.“54   
If the unlimited autonomy of hubris elevates Man to God, moderation, on the other hand, 
is the virtue of democratic politics because it recognizes that autonomy can only be 
preserved if it is limited. Democracy is the regime of self-limitation; once formed, the first 
goal of democracies is to bring about the institutionalization of self-restraint.   
According to Arendt, the key to the attempt to institutionalize self-restraint and to limit 
the boundlessness of action is the “power of stabilization inherent in the faculty of making 
promises. ...”55 Promises are actions by which a collectivity or a nation seeks  to control 
the incalculability of the future and thus to preserve the institutional reality of the present 
for an unspecified time into the future. Promising is rooted in natality. It is the most 
creative of actions, by which citizens themselves bring into being new institutions, new 
realities, new futures, and new men.56 Promising is also the faculty of control and 
limitation without which, “we would be doomed to swing forever in the ever-recurring 
cycle of becoming, ...”57 Promising presents both the brilliance of autonomy and the 
security of limits. Thus, instead of resolving the paradox of politics, Arendt suggests that 
promising, as the “very distinction which marks off human from animal life,”58 enables 
the affirmation of the paradox as central to the human condition.   
The distinctively modern attempt to raise the faculty of promising to an institutional 
level and to apply it to the political problem of natality and limitation is the written 
constitution. The constitution, as the “fundamental Charter embodying the norms of 
norms and defining particularly stringent provisions for its revision,”59 promises to 
provide both a fundamental ground for the creation of political institutions and an 
effective guarantee that those institutions will not be transgressed.60 In other words, the 
constitution is said to solve both the problem of autonomy and that of limitation. 
Constitutions solve the problem of autonomy by transferring certain norms and standards 
from the political to the pre-political realm. They solve the problem of limitation by 
confining formerly political disputes into legal questions. In the next section, I argue that 
54  Castoriadis, supra note 35, at 115.
55  Arendt, HC, supra note 20, at 243.  
56 Id., at 247.  See also On Revolution, supra note 53, at 175: “There is an element of the world-building capacity 
of man in the human faculty of making and keeping promises.”  
57  Arendt, HC, supra note 20, at 246.
58 Id.  245.
59  Castoriadis, supra note 35, at 115.
60 Id .
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the political paradox of autonomy and limitation is, in constitutional regimes, 
transformed into the judicial paradox of legislating and following.
IV. Constitutionalism and Judging
Constitutions, Arendt argues, generate new worlds61 and are the most politically relevant 
examples of natality.  But the problem of the constitution as the source of pre-political 
norms, as Arendt rightly points out, is that any constitution must itself be 
unconstitutional. Arendt argues: “‘The great problem in politics, which I compare to the 
problem of squaring the circle in geometry [is]: How to find a form of government which 
puts the law above man.’”62 She adds, “those who get together to constitute a new 
government are themselves unconstitutional, that is, they have no authority to do what 
they have set out to achieve.”63   
The greatest achievement of the American revolution,64 Arendt writes, and the reason 
that the American revolution succeeded where all others were to fail, was the elevation of 
the constitution from a worldly and political document, to a divine law. The success of the 
American revolution, Arendt argues, “was decided the very moment when the 
Constitution began to be ‘worshipped,’ even though it had hardly begun to operate.65 The 
American Constitution is the foundation of the republic because it combines the 
mythology of religious divinity, the idea of permanence, and the possibility of change in 
one document. The Supreme Court, like the Roman Senate to which she analogizes it, 
continually connects the republic to its origins; it is tied to the originary act of the 
foundation of the republic and that symbolic limitation provides the Court with its 
Authority.“[F]oundation, augmentation, and conservation are intimately interrelated, 
[and that] might well have been the most important single notion which the men of the 
Revolution adopted. ...”66 By incorporating a “pre-rational”67 and divine element of a 
preserved symbolic originary into the constitutional republic, the Founding Fathers, 
created the constitution as an “absolute authority,” one which inspired a “blind and 
undiscriminating” obedience.68 Once the Constitution, the founding act of the republic, 
ceased to be considered a political act among others and instead became viewed as the 
‘beginning itself’ and as the foundational norm of the republic, the squaring of the circle 
was accomplished.69  
The transformation of the constitution from a political act of foundation into a pre-
political object of worship is both the beginning and the end of political action. 
Constitutions, themselves creations, create obligations to abide by the law. It is precisely 
because of the success of the American constitution in establishing itself as the foundation 
of a stable legal structure, Arendt argues, “that the revolutionary spirit in America began 
61  See Robert Cover, “Nomos and Narrative,” 97 Harvard Law Review 4 (1983).
62  Arendt, On Revolution, supra note 53, at 183-4 (Quoting Rousseau).
63  Id ., 183-4.  
64  Arendt, On  Revolution , supra note 53, at 239.   
65 Id  ., at 198-99.
66 Id ., at 200-202.  pg. 201.
67  Id ., at 192.
68 Id ., at 198.
69 Id ., at 204.  
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to wither away, and it was the Constitution itself, this greatest achievement of the 
American people, which eventually cheated them of their proudest possession.”70 In other 
words, Arendt suggests that the worship of the constitution leads to the permanent 
foreclosure of politics and, consequently, an unacceptable limitation on human 
autonomy.71 Arendt warns:
”[Jefferson’s] occasional, and sometimes violent, antagonism against the 
Constitution and particularly against those who ‘look at constitutions with 
sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to 
be touched’, was motivated by a feeling of outrage about the injustice that only his 
generation should have it in their power ‘to begin the world over again’; for him, as 
for Paine, it was plain ‘vanity and presumption [to govern] beyond the grave’; it was, 
moreover, the ‘most ridiculous and insolent of all tyrannies.’... The danger and the 
advantage inherent in all bodies politic that rely on contracts and treaties is that ... 
[t]he moment promises lose their character as isolated islands of certainty in an 
ocean of uncertainty, that is, when this faculty is misused to cover the whole ground 
of the future and to map out a path secured in all directions, they lose their binding 
power and the whole enterprise becomes self-defeating.”72 
A constitution, as Arendt would continually point out with respect to ancient Athens, is a 
polis, a people and a collectivity which the people themselves create—not from a nullity—
but in the continual acts of creation and re-creation which defines for her the height of 
human happiness. Constitution-making, therefore, is for Arendt something that can never 
end; it represents what may be called her utopian vision of permanent politics.73  
70  Id., at 239. 
71  This is, of course, precisely the argument of many liberal theorists in favor of constitutional government.  For 
example, Bruce Ackerman argues that the meaning of constitutional government is that there are certain 
foundational issues, such as free speech, equal protection, etc.  which are too contentious to be openly 
debated in the public sphere.  Ackerman, “Why Dialogue?,” 86 J. of Philosophy 16-17 (Jan. 1989) (cited in 
Benhabib, Situating the Self, supra note 49, at 96-97).   Seyla Benhabib makes a similar argument but argues 
that free speech, as the most important norm, should be the only one off limits of debate, a contradiction 
which she is comfortable with as the substantive normative standard for politics. See Benhabib, Situating the 
Self, supra note 49, at 99.  Arendt too believed that substantive limits on autonomy were necessary. [See her 
letter to Karl Jaspers complaining that during the McCarthy trials: “the judiciary branch … has ceased to 
function and ... everything hinges now on the opinion of the people.. … The republic, which should define the 
framework and the limits of democracy, is being dissolved from within by democracy.” (Arendt to Jaspers, 
December 21, 1953, In Correspondence:  Hannah Arendt, Karl Jaspers, (1993) pg. 235).]  The difference 
between Arendt and the liberals is not that one thinks substantive limits on autonomy are necessary and the 
other does not, but that while Benhabib believes it ethically necessary to name the limit, Arendt argues that 
naming the limit is precisely what is unethical.
72  Arendt,  HC,  supra note 20, at 233, 244, (my italics).
73  Arendt expresses what may be her utopian vision of permanent politics in describing a letter Jefferson wrote 
to John Adams. “And Jefferson’s true notion of happiness comes out very clearly. .. when he lets himself go in 
a mood of playful and sovereign irony and concludes one of his letters to Adams as follows: ‘May we meet 
there again, in Congress, with our ancient Colleagues, and receive with them the seal of approbation ‘Well 
done, good and faithful servants.’  Here, behind the irony, we have the candid admission that life in Congress, 
the joys of discourse, of legislation, of transacting business, of persuading and being persuaded, were to 
Jefferson no less conclusively a foretaste of an eternal bliss to come than the delight of contemplation had 
been for medieval piety.” Id., pg 131 (citing Jefferson’s letter to Adams of 11 April 1823).
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For those whose job it is to interpret the constitution, the political paradox of autonomy 
and limitation is recast as the judicial paradox of legislating and following. If, in judging, 
the Arendtian paradox is to be affirmed, the judge can neither disregard the law and 
decide according to his will, nor can he simply mechanically apply the law even when, like 
the ante-bellum judges, he is firmly convinced that the law is morally wrong. The best that 
a judge can offer is, for Arendt, summed up in Justice Marshall’s now famous phrase, “we 
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.”74 When Arendt describes 
the Supreme Court as a constitutional convention in continuous session, she invokes the 
hope of constitutional government. The hope is to not resolve the paradox either on the 
side of legislating anew which would destroy legal society or on the side of blind fidelity—
even if possible. The essence of being a judge is thinking and judging, which requires a 
judge to work through and within the Arendtian paradox, without ever hoping to resolve 
it. The hope of the judge, therefore, is both constantly to re-constitute the world in which 
she lives, while still preserving the constitution of that world.  
How exactly a judge might negotiate the paradox of judging, Arendt never fully 
elaborates; however, in the epilogue of Eichmann in Jerusalem, she publicly announces a 
hypothetical judgment, which she imagines should have been the decision issued by the 
court. In the final section, I read Arendt’s judgment of Eichmann as a guide to how ‘we,’ 
as judges with the responsibility to speak the truth of the Constitution even as we deny 
the certainty of that truth, should negotiate the paradox of judgment. The judge, Arendt 
argues, must act--at least in certain situations--to re-authorize the existing framework of 
legal limitations.  
V. Judging Eichmann
Near the end of Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt quotes from the District Court of 
Jerusalem’s opinion in which it found Adolf Eichmann guilty of crimes against the Jewish 
people:
”‘Expressing [Eichmann’s] activities in terms of section 23 of our Criminal Code 
Ordinance, we should say that they were mainly those of a person soliciting by giving 
counsel or advice to others and of one who enabled or aided others in [the criminal] 
act.’  But ‘in such an enormous and complicated crime as the one we are now 
considering, wherein many people participated, on various levels and in various 
modes of activity—the planners, the organizers, and those executing the deeds, 
according to their various ranks—there is not much point in using the ordinary 
concepts of counseling and soliciting to commit a crime.  For these crimes were 
committed en masse, not only in regard to the number of victims, but also in regard 
to the numbers of those who perpetrated the crime, and the extent to which any one 
of the many criminals was close to or remote from the actual killer of the victim 
means nothing, as far as the measure of his responsibility is concerned.  On the 
74  McCullogh v. Maryland , 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819).   Arendt quotes a version of this issued by Woodrow Wilson: 
“[T]he Supreme Court is indeed, in Woodrow Wilson’s phrase, ‘a kind of Constitutional Assembly in 
continuous session’.” Arendt, On Revolution, supra note 53, at 200.
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contrary, in general, the degree of responsibility increases as we draw further away 
from the man who uses the fatal instrument with his own hands.’’75  
For Arendt, the Court’s insight was its recognition that Eichmann’s guilt was not of the 
usual form, and that his guilt did not conform to the ‘ordinary concepts’ of criminal 
culpability. While, the usual construction of legal responsibility requires both a guilty act 
and a guilty mind, it was conceivable, the court admitted, that Eichmann had neither. 
Eichmann was definitively guilty neither of physically murdering anyone, nor of having 
the desire to murder anyone. Eichmann was held responsible precisely for his compliance 
with the law, his lack of resistance to laws he should have known were evil, and his 
“participation, on various levels and in various modes of activity,” which made it easier 
for those charged with running the camps, operating the ‘showers,’ and pulling the 
triggers to commit the atrocity of the holocaust. While Eichmann, himself, may have been 
responsible for neither the acts themselves nor for conceiving the acts, he was, as Arendt 
puts it, a “willing instrument in the organization of mass murder,” and thus, at some level, 
responsible for the consequences of his actions.76  
The issue of responsibility looms large in the Eichmann trial and in the Court’s opinion. 
Eichmann claimed that he could not be held personally responsible for crimes committed 
by a mass of people. He claimed that he was merely a cog in a machine, and that his role 
in carrying out the Final Solution was an historical accident, that almost any other 
German could have (and would have, given the opportunity) taken his place if he had 
refused. Eichmann claimed, in essence, that when all are guilty, none is responsible.  
To hold Eichmann responsible for his role in the Final Solution, as the Israeli Court did, 
required that they judge Eichmann responsible. But responsibility, as it is understood in 
the West and in Western legal systems, has its genesis in conscience; 77 that is, in modern 
Western societies, people are usually considered guilty and responsible for their crimes 
only when they committed the crime with a guilty mind—i.e. with the requisite mens rea—
which is understood to be an intent to do an act which is against the law by a person who 
also can be held responsible for the crime.78 The law, therefore, usually assumes the voice 
of conscience—one’s duty to obey the law—which acts to limit the self-interested desires 
and inclinations of individuals. In Nazi Germany, however, conscientious obedience to 
the law ceased to be restraint on evil: evil “lost the quality of temptation. Many Germans 
and many Nazis … must have been tempted not to murder, not to rob, not to let their 
neighbors go off to doom ... and not to become accomplices in all these crimes by 
benefiting from them. But, God knows, they had learned how to resist temptation.”79 The 
difficulty Eichmann presented the court was that under traditions of positivist law, he had 
75 Arendt, Eichmann, supra note 16, at 247 (first italics added).
76  Id ., at 278.  
77  Arendt, HC, supra note 20, at 245. 
78  See Sanford Kadish, “Mens Rea—The Mental State Accompanying The Forbidden Acts,” in Criminal Law and 
its Process (1962) ed. by Paulsen and Kadish, pgs. 229-270. Every crime has a specific level of mens rea which 
a person must be found to have before he can be convicted.  In certain circumstances, such as insanity or 
duress, persons who committed a crime which they intended to commit, may not be considered responsible—
and thus would not be considered guilty—if they are not found to have the sufficient level of guilt.
79  Eichmann, supra note 16, at 150, 105.
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acted according to his conscientious duty to obey the law, and he had acted without a 
guilty intent. Technically, he was not responsible for his crimes.80 
Arendt’s image of Eichmann as a law abiding citizen is crucial to understanding 
Arendt’s epilogue, where she criticizes the Israeli Court’s decision and suggests her own 
alternative. The irony of the Court’s decision is contained in its statement that, “‘the 
degree of responsibility increases as we draw further away from the man who uses the 
fatal instrument with his own hands.’” The Israeli judges, Arendt reminds us, play a role 
in the social organization of violence. Judges differ from poets and critics because their 
interpretations, even the weak or bad ones, are carried out “in a field of pain and death.” 81  
For judges rhetorically to ground their sentence of Eichmann on 53 sections of precedent 
is, as Arendt implies, to tell Eichmann that he is guilty and sentenced to die because he 
broke the law—a conclusion that turns on nothing other than the right of the victor to try 
the loser in the victor’s courts. 
The judges’ insistence that Eichmann’s responsibility inhered in his intention to break 
the law represents an absolute blindness to the very danger that Eichmann embodies. It 
represents, Arendt suggests, a resistance to thinking, a self-certain and banal 
thoughtlessness which Arendt argues should be understood as a resistance to the 
perspective of the other. This resistance to thinking is precisely what Arendt condemns in 
Eichmann:
”The longer one listened to [Eichmann], the more obvious it became that his inability 
to speak was closely connected with an inability to think, namely, to think from the 
standpoint of somebody else. No communication was possible with him, not because 
he lied but because he was surrounded by the most reliable of all safeguards against 
the words and the presence of others, and hence against reality as such.“ 82  
That most reliable of safeguards is none other than the certainty of one’s own convictions 
and identity. Eichmann’s thoughtlessness is revealed to Arendt in his self-certainty. Even 
during his trial, Eichmann maintained that he had acted according to his conscientious 
duty as a law-abiding citizen. It is for this reason that Arendt cannot sanction the Israeli 
judge’s attempt to kill Eichmann with no other justification than that the law of the victor 
authorizes it. The Court’s blindness to Eichmann’s reality—the reality of his certainty of 
moral conviction as having acted according to his duty to obey the law—is the flip side of 
its unshakable faith in its own reality—the reality of the judges’ own certainty of their 
moral obligation to judge Eichmann according to Israeli law.  
Like the ante-bellum judges, and chillingly like Eichmann as well, the Israeli judges 
judged Eichmann as different, evil, and thus guilty without engaging in the process of 
thinking which would have explored the parallels between the judges’ self-certainty of 
their right to judge Eichmann with his similarly legally inspired certainty of his dutiful 
obligation to follow the Fuhrer’s law. Unwilling to question its own self-certainty and thus 
80 A mistake of law (claiming that one did an act but did not know it was against the law) is no defense in 
criminal law. Yet one cannot be prosecuted for committing a wrong, even an intended wrong, if the wrong is 
not illegal.   
81  Cover, “Violence and the Word,” supra note 9, at 1609.
82 Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, (1978) pg. 49. 
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claiming to act with the clean hands of moral authority, the Israeli Court, Arendt argues, 
‘buried’ its insights concerning the unprecedented nature of Eichmann’s guilt “under a 
flood of precedents— … to which the first fifty-three sections of the judgment correspond
—many of which sounded, at least to the layman’s ear, like elaborate sophisms.”83 The 
Court, Arendt argues, refused to recognize explicitly the true nature of Eichmann’s crime, 
which was thoughtlessly to give his support to a legal regime of organized genocide.
In her introduction to The Life of the Mind, Arendt writes that Eichmann’s 
thoughtlessness was the original impulse for her consideration of the question of thought 
as an activity with the potential to prevent evil. Arendt asks: “Could the activity of 
thinking as such, the habit of examining whatever happens to come to pass or to attract 
attention, regardless of results and specific content, could this activity be among the 
conditions that make men abstain from evil-doing or even actually ‘condition’ them 
against it?”84 Thinking, for Arendt, is both the activity of critically examining oneself and
—and this is included in the former—doing so by imagining oneself through the eyes of 
others.85  
While Arendt praises the honesty of parts of the Israeli Court’s decision recognizing the 
novelty of Eichmann’s crime, she criticizes the Court for its inability to breakdown the 
symbolic barrier between the judges and Eichmann. Instead of admitting Eichmann’s 
normalcy, his everyday thoughtlessness, the Court sought to portray Eichmann as a 
criminal, an other. In contrast to the judges’ certitude of their right to judge Eichmann, 
Arendt through the example of the first 56 pages of her book, makes a courageous effort 
to understand Eichmann as human and to comprehend how, as human, the rest of us are 
prone to the same thoughtlessness as was he. What Arendt denied herself is the 
unquestioned reliance on the safeguard of faith that her own reality is different from and 
better than Eichmann’s; it is such a risk of the self,86 an attempt to communicate even 
when communication seems almost impossible, that Arendt suggests is necessary if 
justice is to avoid falling into the trap of thoughtlessness.
It is not that Arendt came to respect Eichmann; she most certainly did not. But that she 
made an effort to understand him and thus to respect him is central to understanding 
Arendt’s attempt to negotiate the paradox of autonomy and limitation in her judgment. 
Respect, Arendt argues, is the corollary of love in the domain of public affairs and respect, 
“because it concerns only the person, is quite sufficient to prompt forgiving of what a 
person did, for the sake of the person.”87 Forgiveness is predicated on respect because it is 
the person who is forgiven and not the act. Thus forgiveness, as Arendt argues, is the 
polar opposite of vengeance. Whereas vengeance re-acts against an original trespass in a 
spiraling cycle of wrong, forgiveness “is the only reaction which does not merely re-act but 
acts anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act which provoked it ...”88 
83 Id ., at 263.
84 Life of the Mind , 5.
85 For an example of the difficulty of imagining oneself through the eyes of the other and in doing so of putting 
the very identity of one’s self at risk, see Drucilla Cornell’s essay “Diastrologies,” in Cornell, Transformations, 
supra note 48, at 45-56, 170-94.
86 For an explanation of what I mean by ‘risk of the self,’ see my article, “Risk of the self: Drucilla Cornell’s 
Transformative Philosophy,” 9 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal, 175 (1994).
87  Arendt, HC, supra note 20, at 243.
88 Id. at 241.
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Forgiveness, as an act of judgment, is an autonomous act that frees both parties from the 
cycle of vengeance not by erasing the evil of the act, but by coming to respect the actor. 
Here it is instructive to observe, however sketchily, the similarities between Arendt’s 
unsuccessful attempt to come to respect and therefore to forgive Eichmann, and Hegel’s 
account of the dialectic of the conscientious transgressor and judging consciousness in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. Eichmann, in Arendt’s retelling of Hegel’s story, plays the role 
of the moral actor who acts according to his conscience, his conviction as to his duty. This 
is why Eichmann’s self-image as a conscientious and law-abiding citizen is central to 
Arendt’s text. Like Hegel’s moral actor, Eichmann recognized that, “the essence of the 
action, duty, consists in conscience’s conviction about it.”89 That is, in the realm of 
morality, the highest truth, the claim to universality, is essentially the moral actor’s 
conviction that he acts according to his duty. Whatever positive content is adopted as the 
universal duty and thus as the essence of moral obligation cannot be refuted by another 
consciousness claiming that another content ought to have been placed there instead.  
Every content, because it is determinate, stands on the same level as any other, even if 
it does seem to be characterized by the elimination in it of elements of particularity. It 
might seem, then, that action for the general good is to be preferred to action for the good 
of the individual; but this universal duty is simply what already exists as absolute 
substance, as law and right, and is valid on its own account independently of the 
individual’s knowledge and conviction, not to mention his own immediate interest. It is, 
therefore, precisely against the form of that duty that morality in general is directed.90
But if Eichmann’s dutiful adherence to the law is a moral action, that does not mean his 
actions can escape judgment. “Just as every action is capable of being looked at from the 
point of view of conformity to duty, so too can it be considered from the point of view of 
the particularity [of the doer] ...”91 As particular, the moral actor’s claim to duty, a claim to 
universality, is subject to judgment as having fallen away from the objective universality 
of pure duty. For the consciousness that judges, there is no action in which it could not 
oppose to the universal aspect of the action, the personal aspect of the individuality,” and 
condemn the particularity of the action.92 But as Hegel argues, this judging consciousness 
that condemns the conscientious actor is itself base and hypocritical because it refuses to 
acknowledge that its own judgment--which it attempts to pass off as dutiful and correct--
is itself just another manner of being wicked.  
It is the moral actor and not the judging consciousness that recognizes the similarity in 
these opposing positions and, as did Eichmann, who saw his trial as an opportunity to 
make “peace with his former enemies.”93 Eichmann admitted all he had done, but claimed 
the mantel of truth: “‘One of the few gifts fate bestowed upon me is a capacity for truth 
insofar as it depends on myself.’”94 Such a claim, Arendt cautioned, must be taken 
seriously, but only to show how Eichmann’s self-certainty, his unyielding belief in the 
veritude of his conscience, makes him appear the clown. Even as a clown, Eichmann--like 
89 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A.V. Miller, at 388.
90 Id. 392.
91  Id. 404.
92  Id. 
93  Eichmann , supra note 20 at 53.
94 Id. at 54.
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Hegel’s moral actor--recognizes the similarity those who judge him and, perceiving this 
identity and giving utterance to it, he [the moral actor] confesses this to the other, and 
equally expects that the other, having in fact put himself on the same level, will also 
respond in words in which he will give utterance to this identity with him, and expects 
that this mutual recognition will now exist in fact. ... But the confession of the one who is 
wicked, ‘I am so’, is not followed by a reciprocal similar confession.95
The moral actor, like Eichmann, expects his confession of the non-universality of his 
conscientious action to be met with a similar confession, a reciprocal acknowledgment of 
the evil and self-certainty of his judges; instead, the moral actor meets with the ‘hard 
heart’ of judging consciousness which “rejects any continuity with the other” and repulses 
and expels that other as evil in contrast to the serene beauty of the judging consciousness.  
The Israeli judges, like Hegelian ‘beautiful souls,’ retreat into their comfortable 
hierarchies (comfortable because they are hierarchical) that enable them to judge 
Eichmann precisely for what Eichmann admits to doing which is participating in the 
holocaust.  
If the Israeli judges never consider the possibility of respecting Eichmann, Arendt does 
make that attempt. She has to because, like Hegel, she understands that punishment is in 
fact a form of forgiveness. The breaking of the hard heart, the safe cocoon of self-certainty 
erected by the judging consciousness, requires that judge as well as judged recognize that 
each acts on the conviction of conscience. While one more truthfully represents the spirit 
of the community, both, in the eyes of the other, are wrong. Punishment, unlike revenge, 
does not seek to erase the act, but to right the wrong. The wrongdoer, the transgressor, 
must be shown his transgression from the law and reintegrated into the law. This is the 
source of both Hegel’s line that the law is only actualized in punishment, as well as 
Arendt’s argument that it is impossible “to punish what has turned out to be 
unforgivable.”96 Punishment, unlike vengeance, requires forgiveness and forgiveness, 
which is oriented to the actor rather than the act, requires respect. The respect, as Arendt 
emphasizes in her unbelieving repetition that Eichmann acted according to his conviction 
as to his legal duty, is thought, in Hegel’s analysis, to arise from the requirement of 
conscientious action. If someone is a conscientious objector, or breaks the law in the 
name of conscience, we are comfortable condemning the act, but usually continue to 
respect the actor’s commitment to duty. The wounds of spirit, Hegel assures us, heal, and 
leave no scars behind. Forgiveness, Arendt adds, is the radical and autonomous newness 
that, out of respect for the person’s conscientiousness, enables the reintegration of the 
individual into the community. 
It must be observed that Arendt’s ultimate decision to hang Eichmann is not presented 
as punishment. It is, as Arendt argues, vengeance for an unforgivable harm. Radical evils 
are just those acts that can be neither punished or forgiven; the individual drops out and, 
despite his conscientious convictions, is judged unforgivable. All that can be done in the 
face of such radical evil, Arendt suggests, is to “repeat with Jesus: ‘It were better for him 
that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and he cast into the sea.’”97  
95  Hegel, at 405.
96 Arendt, HC, supra note 20, at 241.
97  Id. at 241.
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I will come to Arendt’s actual judgment in which she hangs a millstone from Eichmann’s 
neck shortly, but it is first necessary to understand how Arendt justifies her ability to sit in 
judgment of Eichmann. Arendt’s attempt to understand Eichmann as worthy of respect, 
threatens to eliminate the space, the spectatorial distance as well as the temporal 
reflection which makes judging possible. Judging requires standards and criteria that are 
applied to another; but when that other is understood, and understood as reciprocal 
actors to those who judge, judging that other becomes in a sense judging oneself. How is 
it that Arendt’s injunction to think so as to hear the words of the other does not lead to 
situation in which judging is impossible?
I think Arendt tried to answer this question in her epilogue. “We must stress,” Arendt 
writes, “the judges’ firm belief that they had no right to become legislators, that they had 
to conduct their business within the limits of” the law.98 Like the ante-bellum judges who 
upheld the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act, the Israeli judges appealed to their 
judicial function as legal technicians whose job was merely to apply the law. At one point, 
Arendt suggests that the Court could not but approach its task of judging Eichmann 
except as constrained by the law. She writes:  “The Court, moreover, could not overstep 
these limits without ending ‘in complete failure.’ … [I]t speaks with an authority whose 
very weight depends upon its limitation.”99 Arendt, here, affirms the judges’ own 
conclusion that the authority of law depends, in large measure, on the treatment of 
judging as technical application.
Yet in her judgment, the one she suggests that the court should have adopted, Arendt 
appears to reject precisely the limited attitude towards judging to which the Israeli court 
appealed. Arendt appeals not to her role as an official judge bonded to the law, but to her 
role as an autonomous judge with the capacity and the authority to make decisions based 
on her judgment. To understand why Arendt departs from what she elsewhere calls the 
“nature of the law”100 to remain faithful to the law itself, one must take Arendt at her word 
when she declares Eichmann’s crimes and guilt to be unprecedented. For Arendt, 
Eichmann presented the court with a new and qualitatively different situation, one which 
could not disingenuously be brought within past legal precedent, and which therefore 
called for an autonomous act of judging—of creation of a new realm of law.
Does this mean therefore that Arendt, forced to decide between autonomy and 
limitation, resolves the paradox of judging firmly on the side of autonomy? And if she 
does, how is her autonomous judgment to be justified except as the prerogative of the 
victor? Let me state unequivocally that I think there is a difference—one more meaningful 
than the fact that Arendt and the Israeli judges represent the victors and Eichmann the 
losers—between the judgments made by Eichmann and the one made by his judges. That 
difference, however, is hidden within the legalistic justifications of the Israeli court’s 
opinion and only made explicit by Arendt’s claim for the intersubjectivity of her 
judgment.    
98 Arendt, Eichmann, supra note 16, at 274. 
99 Id ., at 253-54. Arendt makes similar arguments in her essay “Civil Disobedience,” in which she argues that 
the authority of judges is dependent upon the consent of the people, a consent which is contingent on the 
judges’ commitment to operate within a defined and limited legal sphere. See Arendt, “Civil Disobedience,” 
supra note 46, at 99-102.
100 Arendt, “Civil Disobedience,” supra note 46, at 99.
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Arendt announces what she says is the sentence the court should have read, but dared 
not. Against Eichmann’s protests that he “had never been a Jew-hater,” and that he was a 
‘victim’ being forced to ‘suffer for the acts of others,’ Arendt imagines the court 
responding:  
“[P]olitics is not like the nursery; in politics obedience and support are the same.  
And just as you supported and carried out a policy of not wanting to share the earth 
with the Jewish people and the people of a number of other nations—as though you 
and your superiors had any right to determine who should and who should not 
inhabit this world—we find that no one, that is, no member of the human race, can be 
expected to want to share it with you. This is the reason, and the only reason, you 
must hang.”101   
What is necessary in a bureaucratic and violent world such as ours, Arendt suggests, is the 
maturity to take responsibility for objective consequences of one’s actions, regardless of 
one’s subjective intent. Importantly, her speech is an argument; it does not seek authority 
in the laws, but primarily serves to justify her judgment that Eichmann must be held 
responsible for crimes he committed, even though he lacked, in legal terms, the requisite 
mens rea or responsibility. The difference between Arendt’s judgment and the decision 
read by the Israeli Court centers around Arendt’s decision to employ forcefully the 
rhetorical device of the first person plural: ‘We.’ It is her use of “we,” and thus her attempt 
to speak to and for an imagined world community, a community that she transforms even 
as she attempts to speak for it, that, I argue, is the key to Arendt’s attempt to negotiate the 
paradox of autonomy and limitation.
“We find,” says Arendt. First, therefore, Arendt seeks to assume collective responsibility 
for the decision to hang Eichmann. She proclaims her decision as an at least partially 
autonomous—as opposed to a fully limited—judgment. Second, by using the collective 
‘we,’ Arendt presumes to speak for the relevant community. “We,” she argues, find that 
“no member of the human race” should have to share the Earth with Eichmann.  Arendt 
turns the trial of Eichmann into a collective accusation rather than an attempt to prove 
specific guilty acts or a guilty mind. She thus professes a faith that the human community 
will agree with her assertion. By invoking the collective ‘we,’ Arendt asks those for whom 
she speaks to accept her characterization of themselves, to accept and take responsibility 
for their collective action, and thus in doing so, to re-constitute ourselves as individuals. 
In writing ‘we find,’ Arendt imaginatively traverses what I have argued is the central 
paradox of her political and philosophical thinking, the paradox between political 
autonomy and political limitation. In sentencing Eichmann based on a subjective 
determination—the ‘we find’—Arendt acknowledges that she, and through her the human 
race, is the source of the norms upon which collective judgment is founded. In terms of 
Arendt’s own vocabulary, speaking the sentence becomes a political action through which 
she injects her own self—and with her the human race—into the public sphere of narrative 
self-creation. Who Hannah Arendt is and, more importantly, who the world is cannot but 
change as the public begins the never-ending process of interpreting and re-interpreting 
101 Arendt, Eichmann, supra note 16, at 279. (emphasis my own).
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the implications of their collective statement. Arendt’s speech is, in essence, a claim about 
collective identity; as a thoughtful claim, it is one that does not reassert a pre-existing and 
unchanging identity. As a claim, however, it is one that she, nor nobody else can control. 
By saying ‘we’ instead of saying ‘I’, Arendt transforms a legal sentence of positive 
assertion, ‘Based on the law and the precedent I find ...’ into a political appeal to a 
collective identity which can either be accepted or rejected.  
There is an anti-democratic danger in the reading I am attributing to Arendt. The use of 
the first person personal pronoun ‘we,’ as Herbert Spiegelman has argued, is an 
aggressive address.102 Simply saying ‘we’ does not make one the spokesperson for a group 
of people; nevertheless, in certain circumstances, saying ‘we’ serves not as an assertion, 
but as an appeal to others. These others, Spiegelman calls the speaker’s we-partners, and 
when they are addressed in an appeal, saying ‘we’ urges them to listen to, focus on, and 
join with the speaker’s statement. When the speaker’s “we-partners” are not present, 
saying ‘we’ requires the arrogance to presume the authority to speak for others, many of 
whom one does not, and will not ever know.103 The right to say ‘we,’ Spiegelman argues, 
“presupposes some prior authorization or subsequent ratification. … Without it, all we-
talk in the absence of the we-partners is clearly false pretense.”104 Yet even when prior 
authorization is not present, Spiegelman recognizes that the use of ‘we’ is often necessary; 
there can be times, he argues, when ‘we’ serves not as an arrogant assertion of an 
unknown groups’ beliefs, but rather as an invitation, an appeal, to that group to agree or 
disagree with the speaker.105 
When Arendt says “We find,” I believe that she employs the first person plural ‘we’ as 
an appeal to the human community; she addresses that community and appeals to it to 
accept and understand her judgment; in doing so, she provides an example of one way to 
negotiate the political paradox of autonomy and limitation and the judicial paradox of 
legislating and following. Negotiation of the paradox requires the confidence to judge and 
to speak for others, but also the humility to present oneself as a conduit for the voice of a 
larger group. Further, to negotiate the paradox one must show the courage to announce 
her decision as an appeal for support rather than as a conclusion of law.  
Judges must recognize that their authority does come from their limited role as 
interpreters; without this, stability is destined to remain an illusive goal. Yet Arendt’s 
judgment in the epilogue demonstrates that there are times, certain occasions, when 
judging should cease to be a routine of deference and technique, and instead must rise to 
the level of autonomy and natality. Judges, as political actors, have a responsibility to 
make claims on the identity of the polity they are authorized to speak for. That identity, 
Arendt argues, is never given as unalterable; instead, it must be sought and attained 
102 Herbert Spiegelberg, “On the Right to Say ‘We’:  A linguistic and Phenomenological Analysis,” in George 
Psathas, ed., Phenomenological Sociology  (1973) 129, 133.
103 Id ., at 130.
104 Id . 136-7.
105 Id . The right to say “we” assumes an “‘arrogance of power’ behind the patronizing usurpation of the right to 
speak for the ‘free’ people of the world, when they have never been asked, or the arrogant claim to speak for 
the ‘old’ or the ‘new’ generation ...” Id., at 130. In defending a limited right to say “we,” Psathas argues that 
the frequent misuse of “we” as a persuasive device designed to silence others who may have disagreed, must 
be replaced by an invitation to disagree and catch the speaker in a lie. Though we will continue to employ the 
third person plural and presume to speak for absent others, we also invite critics to show up our arrogance.
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through action. Judges, as actors who in their arguments, indictments, and sentences 
speak for the community in the first person plural ‘we,’ have the responsibility to reveal 
our world as it is. It is for us who are not (officially) judges, therefore, to respond.
VI. Conclusion
The ante-bellum judges who upheld the Fugitive Slave Act, consciously or not, refused to 
confront the dilemma revealed by the absence of ultimate judicial standards and avoided 
the responsibility to judge that the freedom of interpretation demands. As a consequence, 
they had little difficulty determining a stable space from which to judge the 
constitutionality of slavery and of the Act. They refused to risk their stable conception of 
themselves as neutral legal minds; instead they presented themselves as tragic heroes. In 
the higher interest of their legal roles and the interests of society, they were willing, even 
eager, to sacrifice concerns of justice to what they thought were the requirements of the 
law. They appealed to a vision of themselves as bonded to the law, a vision that made their 
own job easier and also resonated with the popular image of judges as those who apply 
rather than make the laws. 
It is the spectatorial distance which is necessary in order to judge another and yet 
doubly denied in the Eichmann trial. First, because Eichmann acted conscientiously and 
according to his duty, the attempt to push him away as different, as evil, as Other failed. 
Second, because Eichmann’s crimes were so extraordinary, the effort to bring their 
judgment under the rubric of legal positivism approximated legal sophistry. Arendt does 
not reject the ideals of that vision of judging appealed to by the ante-bellum and Israeli 
judges. On the contrary, she recognizes that a significant part of being a judge is to 
understand oneself as limited and as stable. Yet, Arendt, like Cover, insists that following 
rules does not exhaust the activity of judging.  
She appeals to the judge as someone who must have the security of identity to risk that 
identity; especially when confronted with situations which reveal the hidden assumptions 
of that identity, a judge must be willing to understand those whom she judges as well as 
herself. But a judge must not only seek to understand; the judge must also accept her 
position as an autonomous actress who has the freedom and responsibility to speak for 
the community in a way that both affirms and changes what the community is and what it 
will become. Judges rhetorically represent and speak for polities; Arendt and Cover insist 
that when they do, they take care to neither treat the identity of the polity as certain and 
unchanging, nor to ignore the fact that their authority to speak for the community derives 
from the consent of the community. In short, judges can neither be wholly autonomous 
nor absolutely limited. Rather, they must be both; they must also be neither.
An earlier version of this article was published in: The Graduate Review, v. 1, #1 Spring 
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